INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDIX
This document contains the results from additional robustness tests conducted for the manuscript "Who's Careful: Regime Type and Target Selection." The primary text makes references to several models that are discussed in greater detail here. All codes, data, and documentation for the tests conducted herein will be made publicly available prior to publication.
THE EFFECT OF RELATIVE CAPABILITIES ON CONFLICT INITIATION
In the main text, we report the difference in the effect of relative capabilities between democracies and various types of non-democracies. This is because the Democratic Selection Hypothesis makes predictions about democracies being more cautious than other regime types.
Because it is relative in nature, neither the hypothesis, nor the theory from which it is derived makes a direct prediction about the direct effect of relative capabilities on dispute initiation.
Thus, while we might expect that increases in the target's relative capabilities always have a negative effect on a democracy's likelihood of dispute initiation, this is not a necessary or sufficient condition for the Democratic Selection Hypothesis to hold.
We nevertheless explore this issue further in Figure A1 , which displays the effect of an increase in relative capabilities across each regime type.
1 When using Polity, we find that increasing the target's relative capabilities reduces the odds a challenger will initiate a dispute for democracies and non-democracies alike. Relative capabilities also have a negative and statistically significant effect for democracies, civilian regimes, and monarchies in CGV, but have no significant effect for military regimes. Among regimes in the GWF typology, we find that increasing the target's relative capabilities only reduces the odds of dispute initiation for Personalist regimes. A similar negative relationship is uncovered for democracies, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Finally, using the Weeks typology, we find that the effect of relative capabilities is only negative and significant for democracies. While this is the case, as we report in the main text, we do not find that this effect size is significantly different between democracies and any non-military autocracy, so we cannot infer that democracies are more cautious than these regimes. It is also worth noting that Juntas are actually more likely to initiate 1 Effects are calculated with respect to the parameter estimates obtained from the models reported in the main text. a dispute against a target when the latter's share of relative capabilities increases. This is clearly demonstrative of reckless target selection behavior. Moreover, the fact that this effect is strongest for non-personalist military regimes indicates that collegial military rule in particular is linked with reckless foreign policy behavior.
Figure A1. The effect of target's relative capabilities on dispute initiation
Note: Effects are calculated as percentage changes in the odds of initiating a militarized interstate dispute associated with one standard deviation increase in the target's relative capabilities from the mean. The solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
USING DIFFERENT DICHOTOMOUS INDICATORS OF DEMOCRACY
The results reported in the text fully disaggregate non-democracies when utilizing the CGV, GWF, and Weeks typologies. This is done in order to more fully examine variation among autocratic regimes. Here, we also estimate models that use each of these typologies to examine the variation between the more highly aggregated categories of democracy and non-democracy.
The results from these models are displayed in Table A1 . Model 1 again uses the dichotomous measure of democracy form polity, while models 2, 3, and 4 identify democracies using the CGV, GWF, and Weeks typologies respectively. Non-democracies function as the baseline category in each case. Across the four models, the interaction between the democracy and relative capabilities indicators is statistically insignificant, and the simulation results indicate that relative capabilities have no greater bearing on MID initiation for democracies than it does for states within the reference category.
This finding is displayed graphically in Figure A2 , which reports the difference in the effect of relative capabilities between democracies and non-democracies. Consistent with our primary findings, each of these estimates is statistically insignificant, indicating that democracies are indeed no more or less cautious than non-democracies. 
MODIFYING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
In our primary analysis, we use MID initiation as the dependent variable. While we believe this choice of dependent variable is appropriate, we are careful to note that the first state to take militarized action is not necessarily the instigator of a particular dispute, nor the state attempting to revise the status quo (see Ghosn, Bremer, Palmer, 2003; Bennett and Stam, 2000) . For this reason, one may also want to examine whether the patterns of target selection uncovered here also apply to a subset of cases where the state initiating a MID is doing so in an attempt to change the status quo in some capacity. As a result, 314 MIDs (22%) were recoded as zeros. We therefore estimate each of the models presented in Table 1 using a modified version of our dependent variable that only records cases where the state initiating the MID was also revisionist.
The coefficient estimates obtained from these models are reported in Table A2 . The results pertaining to the differential effect of relative capabilities across regime types are reported in Figure A3 . As before, only military autocracies are significantly more reckless than democracies. Moreover, the difference between democracies and military autocracies appears to be slightly larger than it is when using the models employed in the primary text. Additional inspection of the results from these models indicates that military regimes are also more reckless than civilian regimes in the CGV typology, single party and personalist regimes in the GWF typology, and machine and boss regimes in the Weeks typology. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered by dyad are given in parentheses. Regime coefficients should be interpreted relative to the reference category, which is non-democracy in Model 1, monarchy in models 2 and 3, and "other" non-democracies in Model 4. The peace-year polynomials and constants are not reported in this table. Table Taken together, this modification of the dependent variable changes our results very little, and, if anything, strengthens the relationships reported within the main text. Once again, the evidence suggests that democracies are no more or less cautious than most forms of non-democracies, while military regimes are particularly reckless. The fact that our findings are robust to this change in the dependent variable offers additional assurance that they are not driven by peculiarities in the way we chose to measure our dependent variable.
Further, we checked the robustness of our results using only use of force MIDs as our dependent variable: i.e., those MIDs with the hostility level less than four are recoded as zeros.
By this recoding, 35% of MIDs (501 cases) are recoded as zeros. 2 The results in Figure A5 again
show that democracies are not significantly more selective than various types of autocracy except military regimes, indicating that our primary findings are not driven by potentially irrelevant MIDs. In this particular model specification, we also find that strongman regimes (regimes with a personalist ruler from the military) are now significantly less cautious than democracies.
We find similar results even when we restrict further the scope of our dependent variable into only such MIDs that the challenger is a revisionist state and the hostility level is greater than three. By doing so, 47% of MIDs (676 cases) are recoded as zeros. Again, the results in Figure   A6 show almost identical patterns of target selection across different regime types. 2 We do not present additional tables for these models in order to remain parsimonious in our presentation of results. The output from these models is, however, contained in our replication materials. 
USING DIFFERENT SAMPLES
Our sample is limited to the post-World War II period largely due to the unavailability of data on authoritarian regime types. However, the Polity data are available in the pre-World War II period.
We reran our models using the pre-1946 data (i.e., to examine whether our results are driven by the particular temporal dimension of our initial analysis. Figure A7 shows that both democratic and nondemocratic challengers tend to be less likely to initiate a MID as target's relative capabilities increase, and that the differences in the effects of relative capabilities are not significant between democracies and non-democracies. We also tested whether our results hold using the pre-Cold war period data (i.e., 1946-1990) , and found similar results reported in Figure   A8 . These findings provide additional evidence against the conventional wisdom on democratic selectivity. Note: This figure reports the effects of target's relative capabilities for democracies and autocracies, as defined using the dichotomous Polity Measure. Effects are calculated with respect to the change in the odds of dispute initiation following a standard deviation increase in target relative capabilities. We find that the difference between these two effect sizes is not statistically significant, suggesting that democracies are not more cautious than autocracies, even in this earlier period of international relations. Note: This figure reports the difference in the effects of target's relative capabilities for democracies and each type of autocracy reported above. Effects are calculated with respect to the change in the odds of dispute initiation following a standard deviation increase in target relative capabilities. The solid line indicates 95 percent confidence intervals.
USING A RARE EVENTS MODEL
A large number of zero observations might unintentionally deflate the standard error estimates.
Thus we check the robustness of our results using the rare events logit procedure introduced by King and Zeng (2001) . We randomly took a sample of 10% of zero observations while keeping the ones (MID events), and then ran rare events logit models using the same model specifications.
The plots in Figure A8 indicate that our main results largely hold, implying that our findings are not driven by the size of our sample with a relatively large number of nonevents. 
USING DIFFERENT MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
Here, we report the regression results using different model specifications to test the robustness of our initial results. First, we run the baseline models that include only the primary explanatory variables (i.e., regime type, relative capabilities, and their interaction terms) and the peace-year polynomials. The results shown in Figure A10 indicate that our findings generally hold. Across all typologies, military regimes are less cautious than democracies. In fact, the disparity between these two groups tends to be larger in these models, when compared to those featuring controls.
We do, however, find, that democracies are now also more cautious than Machines in the Weeks typology. Overall, the results from these models should be interpreted with caution, since the exclusion of controls is likely to bias the estimates. Nevertheless, evaluating these models lends our primary findings additional support, as it demonstrates that our results are not an artifact of the particular constellation of control variables we chose. Next, we run the models including control variables except absolute-capability variables to these baseline models. In the main text, these variables were included due to a concern that absolute capabilities is likely to correlate with dispute initiation and (by construction) our measure of relative capabilities at the same time. Yet the relatively high correlation between relative capabilities and absolute capabilities (about 0.31 with the challenger's capabilities and about -0.31 with the target's) might have some non-negligible effects on the coefficient estimate of relative capabilities and the interactions with regime type. Nevertheless, we find that the exclusion of the absolute capabilities scores does not substantively alter our core findings. The results from these models are reported in Figure A11 . 
TARGET SELECTION IN WARS
While we believe target selection is best tested utilizing the dyad-year as the unit of analysis with militarized disputes as the dependent variable, we also assess patterns of target selection in wars as it pertains to the decision to initiate a dispute that leads to war. The results in Table A3 indicate that democracies are no more cautious than autocracies when initiating disputes or entering into wars. This is evidenced by the fact that the interaction between democracy and relative capabilities is insignificant across both the selection (dispute initiation) and outcome (war onset) stages of the model. We examine this issue further in Table   A4 , which reports the results from selection models using the CGV, GWF, and Weeks typologies, respectively. These results are very much the same as those obtained with polity; the interaction between democracy and relative capabilities is statistically insignificant. This provides additional evidence in support of our primary finding that democracies are not more cautious than autocratic regimes. Notes: All three models are estimated using censored bivariate probit. Robust standard errors clustered by dyads are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As an aside, we also display the direct effect of increasing the target's relative capabilities for democracies and non-democracies in Figure A12 . Across each model, we find that this effect is statistically insignificant. This is consistent with Fearon's (1994) claim that relative capabilities do not have a strong bearing on the onset of war after a crisis has begun. Figure A12 . Effect of target's relative capabilities on the conditional probability of war Note: Marginal effects are calculated as changes in the conditional probabilities of war initiation (given MID initiation) associated with a one standard deviation increase in the target's relative capabilities from the mean. The solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. This figure was produced using the results of Table A6 .
In sum, our findings with respect to war initiation square with our findings on dispute onset. At each level, democracies are not found to be any more or less likely to select relatively weak targets than autocracies. Thus, we find little support for the notion that democracies are particularly cautious in selecting themselves into winnable conflicts against relatively weak targets. 
LOSS OF STRENGTH GRADIENT
The logic of a loss of strength gradient suggests that state strength should diminish as the distance from one's own borders increases (Boulding 1962) . That is, distance inherently hampers a state's ability to effectively project force, meaning that even very capable states may struggle in conflicts fought at distant locations. Without taking distance into account, our measures of relative capabilities might therefore convey insufficient and imprecise information.
More importantly, our models might overestimate the potential challenger's power advantage and its positive effects on the likelihood of conflict initiation because distance might counterbalance the incentives to select weaker targets. Thus, we ran additional models that contained measures of distance and their interaction with relative capabilities in order to see if the extent to which the challenger selects a weaker target systematically varies by distance. In addition, Gartzke (n.d.) shows that the loss of strength gradient may only apply to weak states, and that distance might be less consequential for strong states when initiating conflicts. We therefore also include interaction terms between the two states' individual CINC scores and distance.
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Inter-capital distance tends to distort and undermine the geographical proximity between two states that share a border. Instead, we use the minimum metric distance between two states in kilo meters using a new distance data set by Pickering (2012) . We take a natural logarithm of this measure to capture the tendency of diminishing influence of distance.
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The results from these models are reported in Table A6 . Incorporating distance into our model does not alter our primary findings. Across all models, the interaction between geographic distance and relative capabilities is statistically insignificant. We therefore cannot conclude that the effect of relative capabilities meaningfully varies with distance. Moreover, we continue to find that democracies are no more cautious than non-military autocracies. Figure   A13 displays the difference in the effect of relative capabilities between democracies and autocracies. As before, democracies are significantly less likely to initiate a dispute than military regimes when the target's relative capabilities score increases. The difference between democracies and all forms of non-military autocracies, however, remains statistically insignificant. In short, our results are robust to the incorporation of spatial information into our model.
While we find little evidence suggesting the effect of relative capabilities varies with distance, we do find that an interactive relationship between absolute capabilities and minimum distance. Panels a and b in Figure A14 report the effect of distance as mitigated by the capabilities score of side A and side B respectively. We find that the negative impact of distance is significantly lessened as the capabilities of both the potential challenger and target increase. Figure 14 report the effect of absolute capabilities for side A and B respectively.
Panels c and d in
Here, we find that the impact of capabilities is insignificant for states that are in very close proximity to one another, but that this effect becomes positive and significant as distance increases. Note that powerful states are likely to be both challengers in and targets of militarized disputes. The former relationship is intuitive; powerful states have the ability to project force and successfully engage in militarized conflict even against distant targets. The fact that these states are also more often targeted is likely a result of the fact that major powers are more able to extend their military influence across the globe, and in doing so, become accessible to a broader range of potential challengers and disputes.
In some respects, these findings are consistent with the logic underpinning the loss of strength gradients, at least as it applies to weak states. These states are particularly unlikely to initiate disputes against distant targets, perhaps because of their inability to project force.
Contrary to the general logic of the loss of strength gradient, however, we find that the effect of distance is mitigated for powerful states, which are particularly likely to initiate disputes against distant targets. While this result is somewhat counterintuitive, it is consistent with Gartzke (n.d.), who argues that distance functions as a source of uncertainty for strong states, which then results in bargaining breakdowns. More precisely, conflict is more likely to occur between strong states and distant targets because there is uncertainty over whether the former will be willing to risk conflict at distant locales. In this way, our findings with respect to absolute capabilities and distance are consistent with previous research. Overall, however, these results confirm that our findings with respect to selection are not substantively affected by modeling adjustments made to address the interaction between capabilities (both absolute and relative) and distance.
An alternative, perhaps an ideal way to capture the loss of strength gradient would be to incorporate distance to conflict location into the measurement of relative capabilities. We elect not to take this approach due to inferential problems caused by incorporating conflict location, which is only revealed post-hoc, into a model of conflict onset. There are also practical and computational difficulties when attempting to assign distances to dyads that are at peace. We nevertheless note that addressing this issue is the subject of ongoing research efforts (Braithwaite and Gartzke n.d.) 
DISAGGREGATING DEMOCRACIES
A recent study by Henderson and Bayer (2013) reveals that the democratic-victory phenomenon is not universal. More specifically, they found that Western democracies are more likely win their wars than non-Western democracies. While we do not necessarily attribute this finding to Western democracies' greater level of selectiveness on their targets, our research design allows us to test whether Western democracies are uniquely more careful in selecting their targets compared to non-Western democracies and non-democracies.
We first disaggregated the democracy sample for each regime data set into Western vs.
Non-western democracies using the regional typology of Hadenius and Teorell (2005) . Western democracies include democratic countries (defined by each regime data set) in Western Europe and North America, including Australia and New Zeeland. 7 We include these two dichotomous variables along with interaction terms with target's relative capabilities. The non-democracy sample remains the same. We report the estimates from these models in Table A7 . Figure A15 reports the effect of an increase in target relative capabilities across each regime. 8 These results show that Western democracies are not more selective than non-Western democracies, nor than non-democracies. Across all regime typologies, we find that the effect of relative capabilities is not significantly different between Western and non-Western democracies, so we cannot conclude that either category is more cautious or reckless than the other. We do, however, find that both types of democracy are more cautious than Military regimes in the CGV and GWF typologies, and Juntas in the Weeks Typology. Interestingly, we also find that nonWestern democracies are also more cautious than Machines, or non-personalist party-based regimes. While this finding is interesting, it appears to be less robust than those pertaining to military regimes, as it does not hold across regime typologies. More specifically, the GWF typology also codes non-personalist party-based regimes in its "dominant-party" category. There is, however, no significant difference between this category and either type of democracy. We must therefore interpret the finding that non-Western democracies are more cautious than
Machines with some caution. The core implication, then, is that there does not appear to be significant differences in cautious behavior when comparing Western and non-Western democracies, and that neither of these groups is consistently more cautious than non-military autocracies. This is consistent with the findings reported in the main text. Figure A15 . The effect of target's relative capabilities on dispute initiation (disaggregating democracies into western and nonwestern democracies)
Note: Effects are calculated as percentage changes in the odds of experiencing a militarized interstate dispute initiation associated with a one standard deviation increase in the target's (weighted) relative capabilities from the mean. The solid lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
